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I. INTRODUCTION
Patients diagnosed with terminal illnesses often struggle to ob-
tain medication that provides safe and effective treatment of their
illnesses. One story illustrates this struggle. In 2011, two brothers,
Austin and Max Leclaire, respectively 12 and 9 years old at the
time, were diagnosed with a form of muscular dystrophy.' Du-
chenne muscular dystrophy causes muscular degeneration, and, ul-
timately, death.2 After learning of an investigational drug, the
boys' mother tried to enroll them in the clinical trial for the drug.3
In the summer of 2011, Max was admitted to the drug's clinical
trial.4 Austin, however, was not accepted, because his symptoms
had progressed too far for the study.5 After sixteen weeks on the
drug, Max's health improved drastically, and he was able to walk
and play like other children his age.6 Austin's health continued to
1. Bonnie Rochman, 'Both my Sons Deserve to Live': A Mother's Plea for Quicker Action
from the FDA, TIME (Feb. 7, 2013), http://healthland.time.com/2013/02/07/both-my-sons-de-
serve-to-live-a-mothers-plea-for-quicker-action-from-the-fda/.
2. Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy (DMD), MUSCULAR DYSTROPHY ASS'N, https://www.
mda.org/disease/duchenne-muscular-dystrophy (last visited Jan. 30, 2016).
3. GoldwaterInstitute, Goldwater Institute CEO Darcy Olsen Discusses Right to Try
with Stossel (3/27/2014), YOUTUBE (Apr. 1, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
OpjOJmYA16A (showing John Stossel's "Government Bullies," which was broadcast on Fox
Business television on March 27, 2014).
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worsen, as he was unable to gain access to the drug.7 Max, and the
eleven other fortunate patients accepted for the trial, stabilized,
with most of them regaining muscular strength they had lost.8 The
patients in the trial suffered no serious side effects.9 Despite the
positive results of the testing and the inevitability of death for other
patients with this illness, no patients outside the clinical trial could
access the drug, because the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
believes that only it can properly assess the safety and efficacy of
drugs.10 The FDA's clinical trial process for the approval of inves-
tigational drugs prohibits other patients from gaining access to new
drugs, with the stated goal of protecting patients from unsafe or
ineffective drugs." Due to this lack of access to the experimental
drug, other patients may only use the less successful, approved
drugs, leaving them likely to die from the illness. As Max improved
in health, Austin continued to worsen.12 Should Austin be denied
access to the drug that saved his brother's life just because the
FDA's arbitrary rules claim to protect patients from the possible
harm of ineffective or unsafe new drugs? This article argues that,
even assuming that the FDA rules protect patients from harm, ter-
minally ill patients who have no other treatment options should be
able to make their own medical choices concerning use of new drugs,
rather than being subject to the hegemony of the FDA.
This article addresses the topic of terminally ill patients access-
ing investigational new drugs, when those patients have no other
remaining treatment options. This article discusses the history of
the FDA and the drug approval process, and then examines the cur-
rent regulations imposed on investigational drugs. Part II explains
the history of drug regulation in the United States, as well as the
current drug regulation and new drug approval process under the
7. Id. While, obviously, admission to a clinical trial or investigational drug does not
guarantee a cure, that access at least gives the patient a chance of a cure, when the FDA
rules would instead result in access merely to drugs that have provided only marginal treat-
ment for the illness. See, e.g., id. It is possible that the new drug would not help Austin at
all, but this article argues that, regardless of efficacy, the use of new drugs should be decided
by the patient in consultation with the physician, rather than a government bureaucrat.




12. Id. Austin LeClaire eventually gained access to the new drug through a different
clinical trial, which he believes has helped to slow the progression of the disease. Alex Hogan,
Hyacinth Empinado & Jeffery DelViscio, For Two Brothers with Duchenne, an FDA Drug
Approval Brings Joy and Relief, FOX NEWS (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com
/health/20 16/09/20/for-two-brothers-with-duchenne-fda-drug-approval-brings-joy-and-re-




FDA. Part III covers the various problems with the current new
drug approval process, such as the arbitrariness and delays in-
volved in the approval process, and the lack of new drug access for
terminally ill patients.
Part IV analyzes the groups that have formed to advocate for ex-
panded drug access for terminally ill patients, such as the Abigail
Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs,13 and the efforts
they have undertaken to achieve their goals. This section also an-
alyzes Abigail Alliance's federal lawsuit against the FDA, Abigail
Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschen-
bach,14 which was the Abigail Alliance's initial effort to expand drug
access for terminally ill patients. Part V argues that the Alliance's
asserted right of terminally ill patients to access new drugs was
fundamental and should have been protected.
Part VI explores the crux of this article: more recent efforts un-
dertaken by advocates for new drug access for terminally ill pa-
tients, including states' so-called Right to Try laws.15 This section
also discusses other efforts to expand new drug access that have
made less headway but actually provide more realistic opportuni-
ties for reform, such as changes in federal law or regulation. The
section concludes by noting the possibility that the recent efforts to
expand new drug access for terminally ill patients may still provide
a political solution to the problem, though the state Right to Try
laws will ultimately fail due to the supremacy of federal law. Part
VII then concludes by finding that the state Right to Try laws will
fail to directly expand access to new drugs, but may succeed in
bringing about a political solution to expanding access by pressur-
ing the FDA to modify its regulations.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES TO THE PRESENT DAY
Early federal drug regulation was minor, not widespread, and
only began in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century in
13. Abigail Alliance, founded in 2001, advocates for expanded new drug access for termi-
nally ill patients. Our Story, ABIGAIL ALLIANCE, http://www.abigail-alliance.org/story.php
(last visited Jan. 18, 2016). The group began after Abigail Burroughs was diagnosed with
cancer and unable to access experimental drugs, ultimately dying. Id.
14. 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006) [Abigail Alliance 1], rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) [Abigail Alliance 11].
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response to rampant drug "misbranding" and "adulteration."16
Since that time, however, the United States Government created
the Food and Drug Administration, which now implements a vast
regulatory regime concerning the approval of drugs for sale to pa-
tients.1 7 The history of the development of drug regulation is im-
portant for understanding how the current regime has developed
and also in determining whether drug regulation has been part of
the nation's traditions, which is relevant for analyzing any funda-
mental rights in relation to drug access.18
A. The Development of Drug Regulation in the United States
To resolve the problem of drug adulteration and misbranding,
Congress passed the Import Drugs Act of 1848,19 which was the first
federal law regulating drugs, and applied only to drugs imported
into the United States.20 Fifty years later, Congress passed the first
drug law that directly regulated the entire United States drug mar-
ket: the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.21 The 1906 Act applied
the prohibitions on adulteration and misbranding to drugs manu-
factured in the United States and traded in interstate commerce.22
Although the law mandated that any label on the drug be true and
that certain ingredients be listed if they were included in the drug,2 3
the Pure Food and Drug Act implemented no real safety or effec-
tiveness requirements.24
Congress expanded the drug regulation regime in 1938 with the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,25 which, among other things,
required drug manufacturers to provide scientific evidence regard-
16. Wallace F. Janssen, Outline of the History of U.S. Drug Regulation and Labeling, 36
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 420, 422 (1981).
17. See 21 U.S.C. § 301-399 (2015).
18. See Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d at 482.
19. Import Drugs Act, ch. 70, 9 Stat. 237 (1848).
20. Janssen, supra note 16, at 423.
21. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906); see also Abigail Alli-
ance II, 495 F.3d at 705.
22. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, 34 Stat. at 768. A drug is adulterated, under the
Act, when it differs in "strength, quality, or purity" from the stated professional standard.
Id. at 769-70. A drug is mislabeled when the label of the drug falsely or misleadingly states
the ingredients of the drug, fails to note any narcotics included in the drug, or labels an
imitation drug under the name of another drug. Id. at 770.
23. Id. at 769-70.
24. PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA'S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 53-54 (2003).
25. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2015).
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ing the safety of their drugs before introducing them to the mar-
ket.2 6 The addition of the safety-testing element gained support af-
ter elixir sulfanilamide-a liquid form of an otherwise safe drug-
caused approximately 107 deaths, showing that safety testing was
necessary before any new drug could be sold.2 7 Prior to the Act,
drug producers could even sell their drugs over-the-counter without
meeting any safety standards.28 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act finally addressed this lack of safety standards.29
By 1945, Congress determined that these regulations and stand-
ards should be expanded and created the category of prescription
drugs, requiring a physician's prescription for use.30 The Humph-
rey-Durham Amendment,31 enacted in 1951, finally defined the
types of drugs that would be considered prescription drugs,32 and
effectively codified professional pharmaceutical standards into fed-
eral law.3 3 Congress then amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act in 1962, requiring drug manufacturers to provide evidence of
effectiveness of the drugs before the FDA would approve the drug
for public use.3 4 This amendment, called the Kefauver-Harris
Amendment, created the basic clinical testing framework now in
place and required a showing that the new drug was both safe and
effective.35
The 1945 and 1962 amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act created the framework for the present-day drug approval pro-
cess:36 the FDA must review all new drugs to determine their safety
and effectiveness and use clinical trials for testing before ap-
proval.37 Through these amendments, the FDA was given full law-
making power with respect to drug regulations,38 something that
26. Janssen, supra note 16, at 429. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2015).
27. HILTS, supra note 24, at 92-93.
28. See Janssen, supra note 16, at 430.
29. See id. at 429-30.
30. Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 9 Fed.
Reg. 12,255 (Oct. 10, 1944). See also Janssen, supra note 16, at 433.
31. Humphrey-Durham Amendment, ch. 578, 65 Stat. 648 (1951) (amending the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
32. See id. at 649.
33. Janssen, supra note 16, at 435. See also 21 U.S.C. § 353 (2015).
34. See Kefauver-Harris Amendment, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962). Congress
enacted these amendments, known as the Kefauver-Harris Amendments, after Thalidomide,
a drug for morning sickness, resulted in severe birth defects in some children whose mothers
took the drug. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 695, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2007) [Abigail Alliance 11].
35. See § 102, 76 Stat. at 781.
36. See id. at 782-84.
37. Id. at 781-82.
38. See id. at 782-83.
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has allowed the FDA to implement arbitrary regulations that ulti-
mately prohibit terminally ill patients from accessing investiga-
tional new drugs to attempt to save their lives.3 9
B. The Current Scheme for New Drug Approval
Congress requires FDA approval before any new drugs may enter
interstate commerce, giving the FDA massive control over the mar-
keting and sale of prescription drugs.40 Congress has defined "drug"
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as "articles intended for
use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease in man or other animals," among other things.41 A "new
drug," which requires approval for use, is a drug that "is not gener-
ally recognized . .. as safe and effective for use under the conditions
prescribed, recommended, or suggested," or which medical experts
recognize as safe and effective "but which has not . . . been used to
a material extent or for a material time under such conditions."42
However, critics of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act have decried
the law for its complexity and length, which is symbolic of much of
the FDA's regulation in the area of new drugs.43
The FDA's rules, which control the Investigational New Drug ap-
plication ("IND") 44 and the testing and approval of new drugs, lay
out the approval process for new drugs.45 The manufacturer often
must undertake animal testing of the new drug before submission
of the IND to test the toxicological effects of the drug.46 After suffi-
cient animal testing concerning the drug's toxicity, the drug's man-
ufacturer may submit an IND to the FDA to formally begin the ap-
proval process.47 Within the IND, the manufacturer must include
information regarding its plan for clinical testing, as well as the re-
sults of animal testing to show that the drug is safe enough to begin
human testing.48 The FDA then reviews the application, along with
39. See Janssen, supra note 16, at 439.
40. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(a) (West 2015).
41. Id. § 321(g)(1).
42. Id. § 321(p)(l)-(2).
43. See, e.g., Kimiya Sarayloo, A Poor Man's Tale of Patented Medicine: The 1962Amend-
ments, Hatch-Waxman, and the Lost Admonition to Promote Progress, 18 QUINNIPIAC
HEALTH L.J. 1, 25 (2015) (quoting Judge Roger W. Titus as stating that, "[t]here's a special
place in Hell where they torture people who write things like this").
44. The IND is the application form that declares a drug manufacturer's desire to start
human clinical trials in an attempt to bring the new drug to market. HILTS, supra note 24,
at 168.
45. See Investigational New Drug Application, 21 C.F.R. § 312.1 (West 2015).
46. See id. §312.23(a)(8). The animal testing varies widely in extent and type based on
other FDA requirements not discussed in this article. See id.
47. Id. § 312.20.
48. Id. § 312.23(a)(3)(iv).
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an Institutional Review Board ("IRB") made up of faculty from hos-
pitals and drug research groups.4 9 Once the FDA and IRB review
the animal testing results, the FDA and IRB must approve the drug
for clinical testing on humans in order for the new drug to continue
on the approval process.5 0
C. The FDA's Three Phase Approval Process
The FDA's new drug approval process consists of three phases of
human clinical testing,5 1 involving studies in which physicians give
human subjects the new drug or, often in the second and third
phase, a placebo or a previously-approved drug created for the same
purpose as the new drug being tested.52 The physicians and other
health care experts then monitor the subjects to examine the new
drug's effects on the subjects.53 The first phase of clinical trials "[is]
designed to determine the metabolism and pharmacologic actions
of the drug in humans, the side effects associated with increasing
doses, and, if possible, to gain early evidence on effectiveness."54
This phase usually involves between twenty and eighty healthy vol-
unteers, not patients, with a focus on understanding the basic reac-
tion of the drug in the body and determining basic levels of safety.5 5
After the drug passes the first stage of testing, meeting basic safety
standards and showing a lack of toxicity, the manufacturer may
begin phase two testing.56
The drug manufacturer's phase two testing consists of a con-
trolled, highly monitored study, with an increased number of pa-
tients and a different focus.5 7 The second phase's purpose is to de-
termine the effectiveness of the drug, as well as discovering any side
49. Id. § 312.23(a)(1)(iv); see also The FDA's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs are
Safe and Effective, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/drugs/re-
sourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm [hereinafter FDA's Drug Review Process].
50. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(1)(iv); see also FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 49.
51. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21.
52. FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 49.
53. Id.
54. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1).
55. Id. See FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 49. The FDA's requirement of basic
safety levels means that the testing does not show "unacceptable toxicity," as determined by
the FDA. Id.
56. FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 49.
57. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b). Whereas the phase one testing focuses on toxicity and is not a
highly controlled study, phase two studies focus on effectiveness and consist of controlled
testing, with some patients receiving the new drug and others receiving a placebo or other
drug designed to treat the illness. FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 49.
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effects or risks of using the drug.58 The second stage of testing usu-
ally involves "no more than several hundred subjects."59
Once the clinical testing in phase two has shown the drug is ef-
fective,6 0 phase three begins with both controlled and uncontrolled
testing.6 1 The third phase provides the final testing of the drug's
safety and effectiveness in order to provide a fuller understanding
of the risks and benefits of the drug to aid physicians in properly
labeling the drug before prescribing it to a patient.62 As many as
several thousand patients may take part in phase three testing.63
Once the FDA determines the drug has shown sufficient levels of
safety and effectiveness,6 4 the drug passes the third and final phase
of clinical testing, moving the new drug to the next step of the total
approval process.6 5
The data collected from the clinical trials must be included in the
drug manufacturer's New Drug Application ("NDA") to the FDA. 66
The NDA is the final, formal request that the FDA approve the new
drug for marketing and sale,67 and must include all the data col-
lected from the drug's human and animal testing.6 8 The FDA has
sixty days to decide whether to even consider the application, as the
FDA may decide that the manufacturer must carry out further test-
ing or include more information and thus refuse to consider the
58. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b).
59. Id.
60. The FDA's effectiveness standards require that the new drug "have the effect it pur-
ports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended or sug-
gested in its labeling." Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 21 C.F.R. §
314.125(b)(5) (West 2016). For the FDA to consider the drug to be effective, the drug must
result in a "statistically significant effect on a clinically meaningful endpoint." EILEEN
NAVARRO, EVIDENCE OF CLINICAL EFFECTIVENESS AND DATA REQUIREMENTS 11 (2015),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/smallbusinessassis-
tance/ucm466488.pdf. In other words, the FDA requires that the drug show a positive impact
in accordance with its labelling in at least two independent, controlled studies, when com-
pared to the placebo or the other drugs used as a control in the study. Id. at 11.
61. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b)-(c). The third phase normally consists of both controlled and
uncontrolled tests. The controlled tests involve giving one group of patients the new drug
and another group being given a placebo or other drug that treats the illness, in order to
eliminate bias in examining the test's results. The uncontrolled tests merely give all the
patients the new drug. See id.; FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 49.
62. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c).
63. Id.
64. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. Concerning its safety standards, the FDA
requires that the new drug undergo "adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable to
show whether or not the drug is safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended,
or suggested in its proposed labeling." 21 C.F.R. § 314.125(b)(2).
65. See FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 49.
66. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(f).
67. See HILTS, supra note 24, at 168.
68. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d), (f).
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NDA. 69 The FDA's consideration of the NDA takes several months,
with the FDA making a determination on 90% of applications
within ten months.70 The FDA's decision concerning the NDA con-
cludes the required application process. Accepted drugs proceed to
market, with continued post-market monitoring of the drug's safety
and effectiveness.7 1 After drug development, animal testing, the
IND application, at least three phases of human clinical testing,
and submission, review, and approval of the NDA application, the
drug manufacturer may finally label and market the drug for sale,
though the drug manufacturer must receive approval from the FDA
throughout the entire approval process.72
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT FDA APPROVAL PROCESS
While the FDA claims that its entire drug approval process is
necessary for all drugs, the approval process includes many ineffi-
ciencies and delays that make the process more harmful than help-
ful, particularly in relation to terminally ill patients. The IND pro-
cess is complicated, time-consuming, and expensive. In the 1970s,
the approval process took an average of eight years, from a drug
manufacturer's initial research to the FDA's approval of the NDA,
costing an average of $50 million. 7 3 Since then, the process has only
increased in length and cost.7 4
While proponents of the FDA's approval process may argue that
the length and cost of the process are essential, even if the process
restricts patients from accessing new drugs,75 this article contends
that the many requirements create an unnecessarily long approval
process for new drugs. Due to the time-consuming nature of new-
drug approval, there is a drug lag in the United States compared to
Europe, where many drugs attain approval more quickly.76 The
drug lag between Europe and the United States means that many
69. FDA's Drug Review Process, supra note 49.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See FDA Drug Approval Process Infographic, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 25,
2014), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYoulConsumers/ucm295473.htm.
73. Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA New Drug
Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y, 295, 306 (2000).
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Ed Silverman, 'Right to Try'Laws Wrong to Skirt FDA, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct.
12, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/10/12/right-try-laws-are-wrong-usurp
-fda/54tlCnBEQ4DHMlkYdlZIdJ/story.html.
76. See Greenberg, supra note 73, at 306. The existence of the drug lag is significant
because it calls into question the necessity of the American new drug approval process's com-
plexity and length in comparison to that of other developed nations, such as those in Europe
that approve new drugs under a faster process. See id.
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drugs that have been approved for use in Europe are unavailable to
American patients, despite the determination under European na-
tions' standards that the drugs are safe and effective.7 7 The drug
lag resulted because the United States has historically maintained
the highest standards of any nation with respect to drug effective-
ness requirements.7 8
The FDA's high standard may be desirable in many cases, but
with respect to terminally ill patients, the FDA's standard is unnec-
essarily high. Terminally ill patients possess a right to life, and
that right should include a right to try to preserve their lives by
taking non-FDA-approved medication in an effort to live.79 Termi-
nally ill patients have nothing or little to lose if the new drug proves
ineffective; death is inevitable for terminally ill patients, who often
have no other treatment options.80 The fact that many other Euro-
pean nations have a lower standard for efficacy shows that it may
not be particularly dangerous to loosen the FDA's requirements, at
least with respect to terminally ill patients.
A. The Excessive Delays of the New Drug Approval Process
While the FDA has shortened the time required for most drugs to
obtain FDA approval, the length of time it takes a new drug to get
from development to market is still several years, which raises se-
rious problems for terminally ill patients awaiting approval of new
drugs.8 1 The FDA approval process takes approximately seven and
a half years, on average, from phase one testing to marketing of the
drug.8 2 That time period includes an average of eighteen months of
wait time after completion of testing in order for the FDA to con-
sider approving the NDA, 83 though it can take the FDA up to two
77. Daniel Henninger, Drug Lag, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY (2002),
http://www.econlib.org/library/Encl/DrugLag.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2016).
78. STEPHEN J. CECCOLI, PILL POLITICS: DRUGS AND THE FDA 81 (2004). While high
standards may seem desirable, the standards may be unnecessarily high. One may under-
stand the possibility of unnecessarily high standards by considering a hypothetical drug
standard requiring 100% effectiveness and no side effects for the FDA to approve any drug.
At some point, the detriments of heightened safety and effectiveness standards outweigh the
benefits. See id.
79. See generally Kurt Altman & Christina Sandefur, Right-To-Try Laws Fulfill the Con-




81. See Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of Inno-
vation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 164 (2003).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 165.
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and a half years to approve the NDA. 8 4 For a terminally ill patient
who has no treatment option besides a new drug that has just
passed the first phase of clinical trials, this wait time ensures a
death sentence.
While the length of the FDA's approval process may be necessary
in many cases, the process's wait time makes new drugs that are
currently in phase two testing practically inaccessible within the
lives of terminally ill patients. Due to the lengthy delays in the new
drug approval process, the FDA created a certain process by which
a terminally ill patient may apply for access to non-approved new
drugs.8 5 This expanded access provision allows terminally ill pa-
tients with no other treatment options to apply for access to an in-
vestigational drug that has passed phase one of clinical trials, based
on a physician's recommendation.86 These provisions require a
lengthy application process and case-by-case determination by the
FDA, however, before a patient may access the new drug.8 7
B. The Lack of Investigational New Drug Access for Terminally
Ill Patients
Despite the expanded access process created by the FDA, that
process provides little aid to terminally ill patients, because few pa-
tients use the expanded access program due to the complexity and
length of the applications.8 8 The patient's doctor must file an IND
application, patient history, treatment plan, and an assurance that
the doctor will receive informed consent from the patient.8 9 The
doctor must also receive approval from the Institutional Review
Board.90 The expanded access application process requires complex
filings that take an average of 100 hours to complete, which must
be done by the physician at the patient's expense.91 Few patients
are able to have a physician complete such a task, or at best can
84. New Drug Approval Process, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/fda-approval-pro-
cess.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2016).
85. See Investigational New Drug Application, 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.300-312.320 (West
2015).
86. See Thomas A. Hemphill, Is State 'Right to Try' Legislation Misguided Policy?,
REGULATION, Fall 2014, at 2.
87. See id.
88. Christina Corieri, Everyone Deserves the Right to Try: Empowering the Terminally Ill
to Take Control of their Treatment, 266 GOLDWATER INST. POL'Y REP. 1, 10-11 (Feb. 11, 2014)
(noting that despite the millions of terminally ill patients, fewer than 1,000 were able to gain
expanded access in 2012).
89. Id. at 9.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 9-10.
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only do so at great expense.92 Doctors often ignore expanded access
as a possibility because of the time required to file an application
with the FDA, with smaller hospitals often unable to gain expanded
access at all due to their lack of resources for applying and obtain-
ing that access.93 While the FDA regularly accepts the applications
that it does receive, after a 30-day review, the administration re-
serves the right to reject the application.94 The expanded access
process has resulted in minimal new drug access for terminally ill
patients though, due to the complexity of the application, as only
940 patients gained expanded access in 2012.95 The complexity and
difficulty of obtaining investigational drug access for terminally ill
patients led to the formation of groups advocating for further ex-
panded access and changes to the law,96 including by a federal law-
suit97 and passage of state laws.98
IV. ATTEMPTS TO EXPAND NEW DRUG ACCESS FOR THE
TERMINALLY ILL
Historically, many terminally ill patients sought to gain access to
non-FDA-approved drugs in an attempt to save their lives, such as
AIDS patients in the 1980s.99 Similarly-situated individuals have
more recently coalesced into groups advocating for drug access for
terminally ill patients, with the Abigail Alliance for Better Access
to Developmental Drugs ("the Alliance") being one of the most well-
known examples.100 The Abigail Alliance formed after Abigail Bur-
roughs, a cancer patient, was unable to gain access to a promising
cancer drug that her doctor had suggested.101 Abigail lobbied the
drug companies and engaged in television and newspaper inter-
views to gain popular support for her cause, but ultimately never
92. Id. at 10.
93. Id. at 11.
94. Id.
95. Id. Even in 2015, the FDA only received 1,262 IND applications for expanded access
to investigational drugs. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. EXPANDED ACCESS SUBMISSIONS, FY 2010-
2015 GRAPH, at 6 (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/NewsEvents/PublicHealth-
Focus/ExpandedAccessCompassionateUse/UCM471305.pdf.
96. See, e.g., The Abigail Alliance Mission, ABIGAIL ALLIANCE, http://www.abigail-alli-
ance.org/mission.php (last visited Jan. 22, 2016).
97. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006) [Abigail Alliance 1], rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
[Abigail Alliance Il].
98. See GOLDWATER INST., supra note 15.
99. See Editorial Staff, The Right-to-Try Revolt, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2015, 7:16 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-right-to-try-revolt-1423527365.
100. See ABIGAIL ALLIANCE, supra note 96.
101. ABIGAIL ALLIANCE, supra note 13.
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gained access to the drug and died in 2001.102 Her father, Frank
Burroughs, continued the mission of the Alliance, attempting to
broaden new drug access for terminally ill patients.103
The Alliance and similar groups fought to change the FDA rules
in the past and continue to do so in the present.10 4 The possible
paths for change include challenging the FDA rules in court, enact-
ing state or federal statutes, and affecting regulatory change by the
FDA itself. Advocates for change may also effect a change in the
rules by using state and federal statutes as a source of persuasion
to obtain a political solution.105 State "Right to Try" laws are the
most recent form of attempted change to the FDA rules.106
A. The First Attempt for Change: A Federal Lawsuit
The Alliance brought a federal lawsuit against the FDA in Abi-
gail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Esch-
enbach.1 07 The Alliance sought to gain access for terminally ill pa-
tients to investigational drugs that had passed the first phase of
clinical trials. 108 The Alliance argued that the FDA rules violated
the substantive due process rights of terminally ill patients by in-
fringing patients' fundamental rights to life, privacy, and liberty.109
The district court dismissed the Alliance's claim after finding that
the Alliance failed to assert a fundamental right and the FDA rules
satisfied a rational basis test.110 A panel of the court of appeals
reversed the district court decision, determining that terminally ill
patients have a fundamental right o access investigational drugs
that passed the first phase of clinical trials.' Ultimately, on re-
hearing before the court of appeals, the court held that terminally
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. See, e.g., Compassionate Use Programs, ALS ASS'N, http://www.alsa.org/als-care/re-
sources/publications-videos/factsheets/compassionate-use.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2015);
Mission Statement, TREATMENT ACTION GRP., http://www.treatmentactiongroup.org/mission
(last visited Feb. 5, 2016).
105. AIDS patients obtained expanded access in this manner. See Corieri, supra note 88.
106. See GOLDWATER INST., supra note 15.
107. 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
108. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470, 471-72 (D.C. Cir. 2006) [Abigail Alliance 1], rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) [Abigail Alliance Il].
109. Id. at 472.
110. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, 2004 WL
3777340, at *11-12 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004).
111. Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d at 486.
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ill patients do not have a fundamental right to access investiga-
tional drugs, denying the Alliance's claim and ending their law-
suit.112
1. Background of the Case
The Alliance's federal lawsuit against the FDA, Abigail Alliance
for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,113 con-
stituted the first organized attempt to change the current FDA reg-
ulations and approval process. The Alliance sought to enjoin the
FDA from banning the sale of phase two investigational drugs to
terminally ill patients who were not enrolled in the clinical trials.1 14
Beginning in 2003, the Alliance made a proposal to the FDA re-
questing access to post-phase one investigational drugs for termi-
nally ill patients.115 The FDA denied the request three months
later.1 16 The Alliance filed a Citizen's Petition1 17 in June 2003, mak-
ing the same request as in the initial proposal.1 18 When the FDA
did not respond to the Petition within the allotted time, the Alliance
brought suit, challenging the constitutionality of the FDA's rules
regarding the approval process for investigational drugs when ap-
plied to terminally ill patients.119 The Alliance asserted that the
FDA's rules violated terminally ill patients' "substantive due pro-
cess rights to privacy, liberty, and life." 1 2 0
2. Overview of Substantive Due Process Analysis
The characterization of the substantive due process right as-
serted by the Alliance represented the crucial decision for the court,
as the existence of that right determines the applicable standard of
review for the court's analysis of the law at issue.12 1 Standard of
review is crucial in constitutional law cases.122 In this case, the Al-
liance's claim turned on whether the alleged right-"the right to
112. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 712.
113. Id.
114. Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d at 471-72.
115. Id. at 473.
116. Id.
117. A Citizen's Petition consists of a formal petition to the FDA to remove or alter a reg-
ulation or cease an administrative action. Initiation of Administrative Proceedings, 21 C.F.R.
§ 10.25 (West 2015).
118. See Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d at 473.
119. Id. at 473-74.
120. Id. at 472.
121. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
122. The standard of review means the level of scrutiny the court applies in considering
whether the government's law infringes on the claimant's rights. Strict scrutiny is the high-
est standard of review, requiring the court to overturn the law unless the law's "infringement
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access potentially life-sustaining medication where there are no al-
ternative government-approved treatment options"123-was funda-
mental.124 The court of appeals initially determined that the Alli-
ance's claim implicated a fundamental right and analyzed the FDA
rules under the heightened level of strict scrutiny, requiring that
the law be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest o sur-
vive review.12 5 Based on the characterization of the right and ap-
plication of the heightened standard of review, the court recognized
the Alliance's claim and held that the FDA rules violated the Alli-
ance's due process rights.126 When the court of appeals later re-
heard the case, however, the court determined that the Alliance
failed to assert a fundamental right and applied a mere rational
basis test to the FDA rules, analyzing whether the rule was ration-
ally related to a legitimate government interest.127 The court held
that the FDA rules did not violate the Alliance's due process
rights.128 The court's characterization of the asserted right ulti-
mately played a crucial role in deciding whether the FDA rules vio-
lated the Alliance's due process rights to life and liberty.
3. District Court Rules Against Expanding New Drug Ac-
cess
When the Alliance's case initially came before the District Court,
the Alliance argued that the FDA's new drug approval scheme vio-
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Id. at 721 (citing Reno v. Flores,
507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). The lowest level of scrutiny that the court applies in substantive
due process cases is rational basis review, requiring that the law "be rationally related to
legitimate government interests" to survive review. Id. at 728.
123. Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d at 472.
124. Fundamental rights "are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tra-
dition,' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed."' Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (citing Moore v. City of
E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
The claimants of the right must also provide a 'careful description' of the asserted funda-
mental liberty interest." Id. at 721. If a law implicates a claimant's fundamental rights,
then the court applies the strict scrutiny standard of review in determining whether the law
violates the substantive due process rights of the claimant. See id. at 720; supra note 122
and accompanying text. If a law does not implicate a fundamental right, then the court
merely applies the rational basis standard of review in determining whether the law violates
the claimant's rights. See id. at 728; supra note 122 and accompanying text.
125. Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d at 486.
126. Id. See also U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."); supra note 122 and accompanying text; supra note
124 and accompanying text.
127. Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 712.
128. Id. See supra note 122 and accompanying text; supra note 124 and accompanying
text.
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lated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause by denying fun-
damental rights to terminally ill patients.129 Specifically, the Alli-
ance alleged that the FDA rules infringed upon the privacy and lib-
erty rights of the terminally ill by improperly interfering with the
patients' medical treatment decisions and their fundamental "right
to life" by prohibiting the sale of new drugs, effectively giving these
patients "a death sentence."130
The trial court found that the Alliance's alleged fundamental
right was more analogous to the right to physician-assisted sui-
cide-which the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet recognized-than
the right to refuse life-saving medical treatment, as the Alliance
had argued.131 The court characterized the alleged "right to life" as
an affirmative right to drug access, rather than a right to be free
from government interference in medical treatment decisions.132
The court held that this affirmative right was not fundamental, be-
cause no protection of it existed in American history and tradi-
tions.133 Therefore, the FDA rule was not subject to strict scrutiny
and the court instead applied rational basis review, which the court
found that the FDA rules satisfied based on the importance of pro-
tecting patient and public health.134 The court dismissed the Alli-
ance's complaint for failure to state a claim. 1 35
4. Court of Appeals Panel Recognizes a Fundamental Right
On appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, a panel of three
judges reversed the district court, finding in favor of the Alliance.136
The court considered the Alliance's claim as "the right of a mentally
competent, terminally ill adult patient to access potentially life-sav-
ing post-Phase I investigational new drugs, upon a doctor's advice,
even where that medication carries risks for the patient."137 The
129. See Complaint at 10-11, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs
v. McClellan, 2004 WL 3777340 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004) (No. 1:03CV1601).
130. Id. at 10-11.
131. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, 2004 WL
3777340 at *10 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004) (noting the Supreme Court's decisions recognizing a
fundamental right to refuse life-saving medical treatment and denying a fundamental right
to physician-assisted suicide).
132. Id. at 11.
133. Id. at 10.
134. Id. at 12.
135. Id.
136. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006) [Abigail Alliance 1], rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir.
2007) [Abigail Alliance 11].
137. Abigail Alliance I at 472.
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court of appeals panel found that this was a fundamental right be-
cause it was both "carefully described" and the United States gov-
ernment had not historically interfered with the right.138 In fact,
the panel noted that the common law held individuals liable for in-
terfering with a third party's efforts to save the life of another.139
Likewise, the court decided that the practice of regulating drugs
based on their efficacy was a relatively recent development in
American drug regulation and the traditions of the United States,
meaning that the FDA's rules were not rooted in the nation's tradi-
tions.140 The court determined that "the right to access potentially
life-sustaining medication where there are no alternative govern-
ment-approved treatment options" more closely resembled the right
to refuse life-saving treatment, rather than that of physician-as-
sisted suicide.141 The court ultimately held that "a terminally ill,
mentally competent adult patient's informed access to potentially
life-saving investigational new drugs determined by the FDA after
Phase I trials to be sufficiently safe for expanded human trials war-
rants protection under the Due Process Clause."142
5. Court of Appeals Reverses on Rehearing En Banc
On rehearing en banc,143 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed itself in Abigail Alliance II, finding that the Alliance's
claimed right was not a fundamental right.144 In making this de-
termination, the court focused on the history of safety-based drug
regulation, rather than simply efficacy-based regulations, begin-
ning in the colonial era.1 4 5 Therefore, the majority found that "our
Nation has long expressed interest in drug regulation, calibrating
its response in terms of the capabilities to determine the risks as-
sociated with both drug safety and efficacy."146 The court ap-
proached the claimed right as one of assuming "'enormous risks' in
pursuit of potentially life-saving drugs," which was not based in the
nation's traditions.147 Applying rational basis review, the majority
138. Id.
139. See id. at 480-81.
140. See id. at 482.
141. Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d. at 472.
142. Id. at 486. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
143. A rehearing en banc means that all the judges for that court, the entire bench, rehear
the case, rather than merely the panel that initially heard the case. FED. R. APP. P. 35.
144. See Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 712. See also supra note 122 and accompanying
text; supra note 124 and accompanying text.
145. See Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 703-04.
146. Id. at 703.
147. Id. at 710.
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held that "the Government has a rational basis for ensuring that
there is a scientifically and medically acceptable level of knowledge
about the risks and benefits of such a drug."148 The court recognized
that "the FDA's policy of limiting access to investigational drugs is
rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting pa-
tients, including the terminally ill."14 9 Therefore, the FDA rules
passed a rational basis test and the Alliance's claim failed.15 0
However, the court did note that the Alliance could challenge the
FDA's new drug approval process through the "democratic process,"
which is "better suited to decide the proper balance between the
uncertain risks and benefits of medical technology, and are entitled
to deference in doing so."151 While the Alliance's fundamental right
arguments ultimately failed, they possessed strong persuasive
power and may result in a different holding if the federal courts
take up the issue again.
V. THE RIGHT TO ACCESS INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS: A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
In light of Abigail Alliance II, this article sets forth the relevant
arguments to combat the en banc panel's decision. While the en
banc court rejected the Alliance's claim that the right of terminally
ill patients to access investigational new drugs was fundamental,
this section argues that the en banc court was incorrect because the
fundamental rights to autonomy, privacy, and life suggest that ter-
minally ill patients should have access to new drugs in limited cir-
cumstances. The autonomy and privacy rights are interconnected
and have both been recognized by the Supreme Court in a medical
context,15 2 though not in the particular context of accessing unap-
proved, experimental drugs. The autonomy and privacy rights sug-
gest that the government should not interfere with the private and
autonomous medical decision-making of patients, unless the inter-
ference passes strict scrutiny review.1 5 3 Terminally ill patients
148. Id. at 713.
149. Id.
150. See Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 712.
151. Id. at 713.
152. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (noting the
individual's right of possession and control over one's own person and the importance of bod-
ily integrity); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (recognizing the right of
privacy's protection against government interference in the context of accessing contracep-
tives).
153. See B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A
Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 306-07 (2007).
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have a fundamental right to life that protects them against any gov-
ernment interference that puts their lives at risk, or prevents them
from preserving their lives.1 5 4 Government interference with ter-
minally ill patients' lives occurs, however, when the FDA's rules
prevent terminally ill patients from obtaining potentially life-sav-
ing drugs when those drugs are the only remaining option. The
right to life also arguably relates to the right of an individual to self-
defense, applied in the medical context, as a right to defend one's
self from death by taking experimental medication.1 5 5
A. The Rights to Autonomy and Privacy
The Supreme Court recognized the right to autonomy in making
medical decisions, based on an individual form of autonomy and
dignity. 15 6 The idea of autonomy in medical decision-making par-
ticularly played a role in the Court's decisions regarding contracep-
tives in Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird.15 7 The
Court recognized the right "to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 15 8 Along with the
fundamental importance of the decision to bear a child, "[t]he choice
between life and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and
overwhelming finality." 1 5 9 The decision to attempt to preserve one's
life may be equivalently fundamental to that of bearing a child, and
the state should recognize that an individual's autonomy extends to
this area as well. Personal medical decisions are essential "to per-
sonal dignity and autonomy, [and] are central to the liberty pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment" under the Due Process
Clause's substantive protection.16 0  The substantive due process
protection of autonomy should extend to an individual's decision to
try new drugs that are currently in the midst of the FDA approval
154. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); Abigail Alliance II, 495
F.3d at 722 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
155. See Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and
Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1818 (2007). While the Supreme Court has
never recognized the right to life in this context, the Alliance argued, and some courts of
appeal judges agreed, that the right to life is applicable in the context of terminally ill pa-
tients' access to new drugs. See Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 722 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
156. See Hill, supra note 153, at 305-06.
157. See id. at 306-07 (describing the theme of individual autonomy, developed by these
cases, in the context of making individual medical treatment decisions without interference
from the government); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold, 381
U.S. 479.
158. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
159. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
160. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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process, particularly when the individual is terminally ill and has
no other treatment options.
The right to individual privacy is related to that of autonomy and
similarly presents a strong argument for protecting a terminally ill
patient's ability to use experimental drugs.161 The autonomy argu-
ments discussed in Griswold and Eisenstadt eventually evolved into
right to privacy arguments in which two landmark decisions were
grounded, Roe v. Wade1 62 and Doe v. Bolton,163 the initial abortion
cases.164 The privacy arguments generally involve an element of
privacy in the patient-doctor relationship and in making certain
medical decisions.165 The Roe Court noted that the absolute denial
of the choice to have an abortion would impose a great harm on the
woman.166 In contrast to the government absolutely making the de-
cision for the woman, as the state abortion ban had intended, the
Court stated that only the woman, with her physician's consulta-
tion, could properly consider all the factors and make the appropri-
ate decision.1 67
The Court's analysis in Roe focused on the fact that only the
woman could properly weigh the many factors inherent in the abor-
tion decision,16 8 which applies similarly to the decisions of termi-
nally ill patients who have exhausted all other medical treatment
options and seek to obtain experimental drugs to treat the illness.
Only the patient, in consultation with the physician, can properly
consider the risk of harm if the drug is unsafe, the results if it is not
effective, the price of the drug, and the results of not taking the
161. See Hill, supra note 153, at 310.
162. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
163. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). The abortion ban at issue in Doe differed from that in Roe be-
cause it included exceptions for the health of the mother, particular mental or physical de-
fects in the child, and when the pregnancy resulted from rape. Id. at 183. The Court held
that the abortion law must defer to the medical decision-making of the patient and physician,
rather than giving only limited circumstances when abortion was lawful. Id. at 192. The
abortion law also required that any abortions be performed at hospitals that held particular
accreditation, which the Court overturned. Id. at 193-94. The Court similarly found that a
requirement that a hospital abortion committee review all abortions before allowing the pro-
cedure was unconstitutional. Id. at 198. The abortion law required that two physicians give
their confirmation before the performance of any abortions, which the Court held was an
unconstitutional interference with the decision of the patient and the physician's own best
medical judgment. Id. at 199. Finally, the Court determined that the law's requirement that
the patient be a Georgia resident to receive an abortion in Georgia was unconstitutional. Id.
at 200.
164. Hill, supra note 153, at 309.
165. See id. at 309-10.
166. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
167. See id. (discussing the ability of the woman alone to consider the relevant factors,
including the harms of pregnancy, the stress of being a mother, the difficulties of raising a




experimental drug. The privacy right of Roe is not absolute though,
as the government may limit the right to protect other government
interests, such as public health.169 Similarly, any privacy argument
in the context of the FDA's new drug approval process could be lim-
ited based on the government's interest in protecting public health.
However, the Roe decision made clear that the government could
not interfere with the privacy right when the woman's life was at
stake.170 The limitation on government interference with the pri-
vacy right when the individual's life is at stake analogizes to the
case of terminally ill patients because the interest of the woman
and the patient in their own lives should overcome the govern-
ment's interests in interfering with their privacy. While the FDA
rules may serve compelling state interests, the privacy right of the
individual to make medical decisions "to preserve the life or health
of the [patient]" may override the state's interest in implementing
the FDA rules on new drugs.17 1
B. The Right to Life
Terminally ill patients have a fundamental right to life that sim-
ilarly supports recognition of the right asserted in Abigail Alli-
ance.172 The right to life includes, as a corollary, a right "to attempt
to preserve life," which must exist for the right to life to provide the
fullest protection to the individual against the state.173 Historically,
many legal commentators believed that the right to life includes a
right to self-preservation, meaning that one has a right not to be
murdered as well as a right to live.174 The Supreme Court's juris-
prudence on the right to life has largely focused on the right only in
the contexts of abortion17 5 and the death penalty.17 6
The right to life found in the Fifth Amendment cannot possibly
exist fully, however, if terminally ill patients are prohibited from a
169. See id. at 154. The privacy right eventually falls when the government's interests,
such as protecting health or medical standards, become dominant. When a fundamental
right is implicated, then the privacy right only yields to a compelling government interest
and a law narrowly tailored to that interest. Id. at 155.
170. See id. at 163-64.
171. Hill, supra note 153, at 310 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164).
172. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006) [Abigail Alliance 1], rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695, 715 (D.C. Cir.
2007) [Abigail Alliance 11] (Rogers, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 722.
174. See Valerie L. Myers, Vacco v. Quill and the Inalienable Right to Life, 11 REGENT U.
L. REV. 373, 387 (1999) (citing John Locke, William Blackstone, and other legal commenta-
tors and discussing their beliefs that individuals have a "right of self-preservation").
175. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57.
176. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, n.141 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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final attempt to save their lives by taking non-FDA-approved new
drugs. The right does not involve special treatment by the govern-
ment, but merely requires that the government not interfere with a
dying patient's attempts to obtain potentially life-saving medica-
tion.17 7 The FDA rules violate the right to life of terminally ill pa-
tients by removing the only possible means of preserving life those
patients have remaining, even if that possibility of life may be
highly speculative. While the FDA rules may protect the lives of
some patients, the rules also sacrifice the lives of terminally ill pa-
tients who are awaiting potentially life-saving drugs that are stuck
in the new drug approval process. The government exists to secure
the right to life of its citizens;1 78 it should seek to protect the ability
of terminally ill patients to fight for their lives, as they attempt to
obtain the last possible chance for life by way of investigational
drugs.
C. The Right to Medical Self-Defense
Related to the patients' right to life, the right to access potentially
life-saving medication may be analogized to the right to self-de-
fense.179 The doctrine of self-defense allows a person to use force
when the life or health of that person or another is placed at risk.180
The doctrine of self-defense has been long-recognized as a defense
against a criminal conviction or tort claim, allowing a person to "use
force against another to protect himself from bodily harm or offen-
sive contact."18 1 The doctrine of self-defense even allows the use of
lethal force in some cases: lethal force against an attacker is justi-
fied when the attacker places another individual at risk of death or
serious injury, even if the attacker does not have the moral culpa-
bility necessary for a crime.182
Applying the doctrine of self-defense in a medical context, if an
individual may even kill an attacker to preserve one's life, then it
follows that an individual may use experimental drugs in order to
preserve one's life. 183 The state may limit the right to self-defense
as well as the medical self-defense right. The individual may only
use lethal self-defense against the source of harm if the source
177. See Abigail Alliance II, 495 F.3d at 727-28 [Abigail Alliance 11] (Rogers, J., dissent-
ing).
178. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
179. See Volokh, supra note 155, at 1816.
180. Id. at 1817.
181. 33 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 211 (1983).
182. See Volokh, supra note 155, at 1817.
183. See id. at 1818.
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threatens the life of the defender, or at least serious harm to the
defender.1 8 4 Thus, again, if the self-defense doctrine was applied in
a medical context, only terminally ill patients could use the doctrine
as a theory for accessing investigational drugs.18 5
The doctrine of medical self-defense has already been used in the
context of abortion.18 6 A pregnant woman always has the right to
obtain an abortion when her life or health is at risk.18 7 In other
words, medical self-defense applies in the abortion context because
the mother always has the right to self-defense against the fetus
when her life is at stake. The mother's interest in her own life pre-
vails against that of the unborn child because the child threatens
her life and the mother has a right to defend herself against that
threat, based on her own right to life.1 8 8
As another limitation on the right to self-defense, the individual
engaging in self-defense may not use force against a person who is
not creating the threat, meaning that the ill patient may not steal
medication or harm others to obtain it.1 8 9 The limitation does not
affect the ability of the patient to obtain voluntarily exchanged
medication, though.190 Similarly, as the defender may not interfere
with others' rights, the patient has no affirmative right to receive
access to drugs, but does have a right to not be interfered with in
attempts to obtain access.191 Just as the right of self-defense is lim-
ited to situations involving imminent harm, the medical self-de-
fense right similarly requires that the medical harm be sufficiently
imminent, meaning that this right only applies for terminally ill
patients who have no other medical treatment options.1 92 The right
to self-defense may be applied to terminally ill patients, as this
right has already been applied in the medical context in other situ-
ations.1 93
184. See id. at 1821.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 1824.
187. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Devel-
opmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 2007 WL 2846053 (U.S. Sep. 28, 2007) (No. 07-444). "If
the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe
abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973). Therefore, the states must always allow
for an abortion to protect the mother's life and health, placing the interest in the mother's
life above that of the unborn child. See Volokh, supra note 155, at 1824.
188. See Volokh, supra note 155, at 1824.
189. See id. at 1821-22.
190. See id. at 1822.
191. See id. at 1827.
192. Id. at 1823-24.
193. Id. at 1824.
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While the right to an abortion is highly controversial, the medical
self-defense portion of the abortion right is widely accepted, likely
due to the grounding in self-defense itself.19 4 While the Supreme
Court has only implicitly recognized the right to medical self-de-
fense in the abortion context,1 95 the right logically applies to the
context of investigational drugs. If a woman has the right to abort
a potential life to protect her own life without government interfer-
ence,1 9 6 then it follows that the woman has a right to attempt to
obtain investigational drugs to save her life without government in-
terference.1 9 7 Post-viability, the woman's right to an abortion de-
rives from her right to medical self-defense, not her reproductive
right to choose an abortion, and this cannot be distinguished from
the context of investigational drugs.1 9 8 The right to medical self-
defense, as used in abortion cases, applies equally as a justification
for expanding investigational drug access for the terminally ill and
supports the argument hat the terminally ill have a fundamental
right to access these drugs in limited situations.
D. Substantive Due Process Analysis if Recognized as a Funda-
mental Right
If the right to privacy, autonomy, life, and medical self-defense
arguments were to prevail, resulting in recognition of the funda-
mental right to access investigational drugs, then the strict scrutiny
standard would apply when reviewing the FDA's rules. While the
state's interests in the FDA rules may overcome the rights of most
patients, terminally ill patients are in a life-threatening situation
and the FDA rules are not narrowly tailored to protect the state's
interests when applied in these situations.199 The state has an in-
terest in protecting patients from drugs that are either unsafe or
194. Id. at 1825 (noting the acceptance of the medical self-defense abortion by the dissent-
ing justices in Roe, the many restrictive state abortion laws prior to Roe, and the subsequent
public recognition of the right to an abortion when the mother's life is at stake); see also Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
195. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
196. See id.
197. Volokh, supra note 155, at 1826.
198. Id.
199. For example, the state's interest in protecting the health of patients from unsafe
drugs does not fully apply for terminally ill patients because their lives are at risk already
from their illness and they are likely willing to take the risk of harm from the drugs in order
to attempt to find a cure for their deadly illnesses. Similarly, the state's interest in protecting
patients from ineffective medication that would waste their time and resources does not fully
apply for terminally ill patients who have no effective treatment options and are likely willing
to try a potentially ineffective medication as a last resort when no other options are available.
See generally Corieri, supra note 88.
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ineffective, but neither of those interests fully apply in the case of
terminally ill patients.
The state's interest in protecting patients from harm from unsafe
drugs is drastically mitigated for terminally ill patients because the
greatest risk for those patients is to die from the illness. The drug
may hasten the inevitable, but may also prevent the patient's
death. Furthermore, the fact that the drug has already passed an-
imal testing and phase one basic safety testing means that the drug
has been shown to be reasonably safe for patients in clinical testing,
meaning most harm would be irrelevant due to the patient's inevi-
table death regardless.200 When the terminally ill patient is certain
to die without access to an unproven, but potentially life-saving
medication, the FDA rules are not narrowly tailored to protecting
the health and safety of those patients, because the rules actually
rob the patients of the only possible option to protect them. This
analysis holds true even if the medication ultimately fails to save
the patient or if it hastens death.201 Therefore, the FDA fails to
narrowly tailor its rules on investigational drugs to its compelling
interest in protecting the health and safety of patients, in the con-
text of terminally ill patients.
The FDA fails to narrowly tailor its rules to protect terminally ill
patients from ineffective drugs as well.2 0 2 The state's protection
against ineffective drugs provides little aid to terminally ill pa-
tients, as they have no other options but to die without any medica-
tion.2 0 3 Because of the situation in which terminally ill patients are
placed, the state has a much less compelling interest in protecting
them from ineffective drugs, considering they have no other options
and the drugs have at least passed basic testing that analyzes ef-
fectiveness.204 The state interests that justify the FDA's rules on
investigational new drugs fail under strict scrutiny review when
applied in the context of terminally ill patients. While these argu-
ments have failed in the federal courts, the ever-changing medical
world and momentum of public support for expanded access may
require the law to change and recognize these arguments as com-
pelling.
200. See Brief of Appellants at 43-44, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental
Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 04-5350).
201. See id. at 44-45.
202. See id. at 46.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 46-47.
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VI. OTHER OPTIONS FOR EXPANDING NEW DRUG ACCESS: RIGHT
TO TRY LAWS AND BEYOND
After the court rejected the Alliance's claim on rehearing, advo-
cates for expanded new drug access sought other avenues for re-
form. The primary method for reform consisted of state "Right to
Try" laws.2 0 5 The state laws allegedly give terminally ill patients
access to new drugs in a manner similar to that sought by the Alli-
ance in its lawsuit.20 6 A similar federal statute provides an alter-
native and more legally solid method for reform, with the Senate
having passed such a bill, though the House bill is currently sitting
in committee with minimal support.207 Advocates for reform may
achieve success by directly appealing to the FDA to change its reg-
ulations and expand access to terminally ill patients, which has suc-
ceeded in the past.208 Even if these methods for reform fail to di-
rectly achieve expanded access, the pressure on the FDA from state
governments, some members of Congress, and the popular support
of the people may force the FDA to alter its rules and expand access
to terminally ill patients.
A. State Right o Try Laws
Despite the failure of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to recog-
nize the Alliance's right asserted as fundamental, advocates for
post-phase one investigational drug access for terminally ill pa-
tients began to push for a change in the law using Right to Try laws
passed by individual states, while also lobbying the United States
Congress and the FDA directly.209 Right to Try laws attempt to re-
solve the issue of terminally ill patients' access to new drugs by al-
lowing a terminally ill patient, who has exhausted all FDA-
approved options for treating the disease, to gain expanded access
to investigational drugs.210 The Right to Try laws are tailored to
assert that individuals have a right to try to save their lives by tak-
ing not fully approved drugs, based on the recommendation of a
205. See, e.g., GOLDWATER INST., supra note 15.
206. See id.
207. See Right to Try Act of 2017, S. 204, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 878, 115th Cong. (2017).
208. See Corieri, supra note 88, at 7-8.
209. See Shari Rudavsky, Legislation Would Allow 'Right to Try'Trial Drugs, USA TODAY
(Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/02/03/legislation-would-al-
low-right-to-try-experimental-drugs/22821457/.
210. See, e.g., GOLDWATER INST., supra note 15 (providing the model legislation on which
many states based their own Right to Try laws).
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physician.211 This was essentially the same relief sought in Abigail
Alliance.212
Similar to the Alliance's arguments in its Circuit case, advocates
for the Right to Try argue that the right is based on the fundamen-
tal right to life. 2 1 3 The advocates insist that the FDA's investiga-
tional process improperly interferes with the fundamental right to
life with respect to terminally ill patients.214 Right to Try advocates
argue that a terminally ill patient who meets the requirements of
the Right to Try laws, including having no other treatment options,
receiving a physician's recommendation, and giving informed con-
sent, should have the right to at least negotiate with drug manufac-
turers to gain access to the investigational drug.2 1 5
1. State Right o Try Laws Gain Wide Support
Many state legislatures have agreed with the arguments of Right
to Try advocates, as thirty-three states have passed Right to Try
laws and another sixteen have recently considered Right to Try
bills. 2 1 6 The laws have reportedly not been used by any terminally
ill patients yet, as there are concerns about how the FDA and fed-
eral government will react and how the laws would actually work
in reality.217
The Right to Try laws are generally based on model legislation
published by the Goldwater Institute.218 The Right to Try law's in-
vestigational drug access for terminally ill patients applies only to
211. See id. at 1.
212. Compare id. with Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470, 471-72 (D.C. Cir. 2006) [Abigail Alliance 1], rev'd en banc, 495
F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) [Abigail Alliance 11].
213. See Corieri, supra note 88, at 20.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 20-21.
216. See Right to Try, TENTH AMENDMENT CTR., http://tracking.tenthamend-
mentcenter.com/issues/right-to-try/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2017). The following states have
passed Right to Try legislation: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connect-
icut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
sissippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, Wyoming. Right to Try in Your State, RIGHT TO TRY, http://righttotry.org/in-your-
state/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2017). The following states have recently considered Right to Try
bills: Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii (vetoed), Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mary-
land, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, Wiscon-
sin, Vermont. Id.
217. See Trevor Brown, "Right to Try" Laws in 24 States Not Working, Medical Experts
Say, WYo. TRIBUNE EAGLE (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.wyomingnews.com/articles/2015
/08/28/news/19local_08-28-15.txt#.ViDTflVikp.
218. See GOLDWATER INST., supra note 15.
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drugs that have passed the first phase of FDA clinical testing.219
The model legislation notes that a drug manufacturer is not re-
quired to provide the drug, and if the manufacturer does then it
may do so either without compensation, or by charging the patient
at cost.2 20 Further, the patient's health insurance company does not
have to pay for the drug, but it may do so. 22 1 The law provides that
there is no cause of action against a manufacturer who has complied
with the law in good faith and exercised reasonable care.2 2 2 The law
places no obligation on any party involved; it merely prohibits state
officials from blocking the patient's access to the investigational
drug. The model legislation prohibits the state's medical licensing
or disciplinary board from punishing the patient's physician merely
for recommending the drug to the patient.223
2. The Failure of Nullification and States'Rights o Support
State Right o Try Laws
Advocates of the Right to Try laws argue that these state laws
provide access to investigational drugs for terminally ill patients,
despite the FDA rules.2 2 4  These arguments rely on theories of
states' rights related to the Tenth Amendment and nullification of
federal law by states.225 Advocates of the Right to Try laws insist
that the FDA rules unconstitutionally interfere with the privacy
and right to life of terminally ill patients, meaning that the state
laws could nullify the unconstitutional federal rules.2 2 6 For these
arguments to prevail, however, the advocates must show that the
FDA rules are unconstitutional in one of two possible ways, either:
219. See id. at 1.
220. See id. at 2-3.
221. See id. at 3.
222. See id. at 4.
223. See id. at 3.
224. See T.J. Martinell, Right to Try: States Take on the FDA, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER
(Nov. 30, 2014), http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2014/11/30/right-to-try-states-take-on-
the-fda/.
225. See id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re-
spectively, or to the people.").
226. See Martinell, supra note 224. According to advocates for the use of nullification to
obtain expanded new drug access for terminally ill patients, nullification has two possible
meanings. In its legal form, opponents of the FDA rules may nullify the rules legally by
passing other laws that would make the FDA rules null and void. In its practical form, op-
ponents of the FDA rules may nullify the rules by rendering the rules ineffective, in any
manner possible. See TENTH AMENDMENT CTR., 2015 STATE OF THE NULLIFICATION
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(1) the FDA rules improperly interfere with the rights of the termi-
nally ill; or (2) the United States Constitution did not delegate the
power to the federal government to create the FDA rules regulating
new drugs.227 The first argument failed in the Abigail Alliance
cases,228 meaning that the state laws cannot nullify the FDA rules
on that ground unless the Supreme Court were to hear a case on
the issue and overrule the Abigail Alliance II ruling. The second
argument will also fail because the United States Constitution gave
the federal government broad powers to regulate interstate com-
merce, which would include prescription drugs sold in interstate
commerce.229
If advocates for the Right to Try laws argued that the United
States Constitution never delegated the power to the federal gov-
ernment to make rules regarding new drugs, this argument would
fail as well. Congress gave the FDA the power to make regulations
regarding the sale, marketing, and testing of new drugs sold in in-
terstate commerce.230 Congress' power to make a law regulating
new drugs sold in interstate commerce clearly derives from the
Commerce Power, granted to Congress by the United States Con-
stitution, because it regulates prescription drugs in interstate com-
merce.231 Therefore, Congress acted in a constitutional manner, in
passing the Food, Drugs, and Cosmetic Act that allowed the FDA
rules,232 under the Commerce Clause.233 Thus, the FDA rules are
227. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion states that any constitutional federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id. Therefore, the FDA rules, as long as they
are constitutional, are supreme and defeat any contrary state laws. See id.
228. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 695, 712 (D.C. Cir. 2007) [Abigail Alliance 11].
229. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
230. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2015).
231. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Power gives Congress the constitu-
tional authority to regulate commerce between the states. See id. Because the FDA's rules
on new drugs are limited to regulating drugs "introduc[ed] ... into interstate commerce," the
rules remain within the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
When Congress determines that an activity affects interstate commerce, then it may regulate
that activity under the Commerce Power, as long as Congress' determination is rational. See
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981). Under
the Commerce Power, Congress may regulate the production of "goods shipped in interstate
commerce," even when produced intrastate, as long as the goods have an effect on interstate
commerce. Id. at 281. The regulation of the production of prescription drugs (which are
goods) that are shipped in interstate commerce clearly falls within this power of Congress,
making the FDA's new drug rules constitutional under the Commerce Power.
232. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2015).
233. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce
... among the several States").
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constitutional and any Tenth Amendment or nullification argu-
ments challenging the rules would fail.
Because the FDA rules are constitutional exercises of federal
power, the rules prevail against any state laws that contradict
them, preempting the state laws under the Supremacy Clause.2 34
Therefore, the state laws provide no direct access for terminally ill
patients, nor do they protect physicians or drug manufacturers from
liability for violating the FDA rules. State Right to Try laws are
powerless as far as providing a direct solution to the issue of ex-
panding new drug access for terminally ill patients, though they
may provide an indirect solution. Other avenues for change still
exist as well, such as a change in the federal law or regulations, or
use of the state and federal law initiatives as pressure to effect a
political solution, as discussed in the following sections.
B. Federal Right to Try Law
While the Right to Try laws fail to directly provide access to ter-
minally ill patients, the state laws may instigate a change in the
law on the federal level. A change in the federal law would directly
alter the FDA rules by congressional egislation. For example, re-
cently introduced before the House of Representatives, H.R. 3012235
attempted to alter federal law to give Right to Try laws effective
power in expanding new drug access to terminally ill patients.2 36
The bill prohibited the federal government from restricting the sale
and manufacture of investigational new drugs for terminally ill pa-
tients when authorized by a state law, such as the Right to Try
laws. 2 3 7 In another federal attempt to expand new drug access, H.R.
790238 sought to directly enact the Right to Try laws in federal form,
which would apply to the entire nation, rather than merely recog-
nizing Right to Try laws in the states that passed the law. 2 3 9 The
law involved essentially the same elements that are present in the
234. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
235. H.R. 3012, 114th Cong. (2015).
236. See id.
237. See id. The bill died in the most recent Congress. See H.R. 3012 (114th): Right to
Try Act of 2015, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/1 14/hr3012 (last visited
Feb. 2, 2017).




state laws and model legislation.2 4 0 Despite the success of state leg-
islatures in passing Right to Try laws, H.R. 3012 gathered sixty-one
cosponsors and failed to even come up for a vote.2 4 1 Similarly, only
four congressmen cosponsored H.R. 790, which also failed to come
up for a vote.2 42 In the Senate, Senator Ron Johnson had introduced
S. 2912, which sought to enable terminally-ill patients to access un-
approved drugs when authorized by state law.2 4 3 Despite gaining
forty-three cosponsors, S. 2912 did not come up for a vote.2 4 4 How-
ever, Senator Johnson reintroduced the bill as S. 204, on January
24, 2017, which has since been passed by unanimous consent of the
Senate, on August 3, 2017.245 A change to the federal law or regu-
lations presents the most definitive method for change, which
seems to have become significantly more possible under the presi-
dency of Donald Trump.2 4 6
In January 2017, President Donald Trump met with several
pharmaceutical CEOs and told them that he planned to "[cut] reg-
ulations at a level no one has ever seen before."2 4 7 President Trump
specifically focused on cutting regulations regarding the new drug
approval process, in order to shorten the time required to obtain
FDA approval.2 4 8 He also explicitly noted the problem that Right to
Try laws attempt to address, stating that "one thing that's always
240. See id. The bill died in the most recent Congress. H.R. 790 (114th): Compassionate
Freedom of Choice Act of 2015, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr790
(last visited Feb. 2, 2017).
241. See H.R. 3012: Right to Try Act of 2015, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/con-
gress/bills/114/hr3012 (last visited Feb. 2, 2017).
242. See H.R. 790: Compassionate Freedom of Choice Act of 2015, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr3012 (last visited Feb. 2, 2017).
243. S. 2912, 114th Cong. (2016). See S. 2912 (114th): Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act
of 2016, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s2912 (last visited Feb. 2,
2017).
244. See GovTRACK, supra note 243.
245. S. 204, 115th Cong. (2017). See S. 204: A Bill to Authorize the Use of Unapproved
Medical Products by Patients Diagnosed with a Terminal Illness in Accordance with State
Law, and for Other Purposes, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s204
(last visited Nov. 12, 2017). A parallel bill currently exists in the House of Representatives,
but it is still in committee and has 45 co-sponsors. See H.R. 878: Right to Try Act of 2017,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/1 15/hr878 (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
246. See, e.g., Carolyn Y. Johnson, Trump Calls for Lower Drug Prices, Fewer Regulations
in Meeting with Pharmaceutical Executives, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/01/31/trump-calls-for-lower-drug-prices-fewer-regula-
tions-in-meeting-with-pharmaceutical-executives/?utmterm=.6b83cl2bd7bd; Patrick Cox,
Trump's FDA Chief May Implement Progressive Approval For Drugs, FORBES (Dec. 14, 2016,
5:36 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickcox/2016/12/14/trumps-fda-chief-may-imple-
ment-progressive-approval-for-drugs/#449846b71c34.
247. Zachary Brennan, Trump to Pharma CEOs: 75% to 80% of FDA Regulations Will be
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disturbed me, they come up with a new drug for a patient who is
terminal and the FDA says 'we can't have this drug used on the
patient' . . . but the patient is not going to live for more than 4
weeks."2 4 9 On the campaign trail, Vice President Mike Pence spe-
cifically addressed the Right to Try laws, one of which he signed
into law as Indiana Governor,2 5 0 and "promise[d]" to "open the doors
to treatment" at the federal level. 2 5 1 The Trump White House
seems to support patients' right to try, though it is unclear whether
President Trump will push for change through a federal law or reg-
ulatory change.2 5 2
C. Regulatory Change: Lobbying and Pressuring the FDA for
Change
Advocates for expanded new drug access could also lobby the FDA
to change its own regulations in order to effect change. Similar ef-
forts to alter the FDA rules and obtain expanded access have suc-
ceeded in the past. In the 1980s, the FDA made major changes to
its rules in order to give terminally ill patients greater access to new
drugs after AIDS patients demanded access.2 5 3 Though the FDA
proved reluctant to alter its rules, the dire situation of AIDS pa-
tients-who had no approved treatment options and would likely
die before any became available-eventually brought about a
change to the rules.2 5 4
In 1987, the FDA altered its rules to create Expanded Access Pro-
grams (EAPs), also known as "'compassionate use' programs."2 55
The primary EAP, called the treatment investigational new drug
(IND) program, allows a company to apply to allow a new drug in
phase three clinical testing to be accessible to certain groups of ter-
minally ill patients.2 5 6 Approval of the EAP makes the drug avail-
able "to a pre-defined patient group."2 5 7 The clinical testing of the
drug must be nearly complete, however, for the FDA to approve the
249. NBC Nightly News with Lester Holt, FACEBOOK (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.face-
book.com/nbcnightlynews/videos/10155090457778689/. See also Brennan, supra note 247.
250. See Starlee Coleman, Indiana Governor Mike Pence Signs Right to Try Legislation
into Law, GOLDWATER INST. (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/en/work/top-
ics/healthcare/right-to-try/indiana-governor-mike-pence-signs-right-to-try-leg/.
251. Goldwater, Boy Pleads for "Right to Try" at Mike Pence Rally, RIGHT TO TRY (Aug. 9,
2016), http://righttotry.org/boy-pleads-for-right-to-try-at-mike-pence-rally/.
252. See Cox, supra note 246; Johnson, supra note 246; NBC Nightly News with Lester
Holt, supra note 249.
253. See Corieri, supra note 88, at 7-8.
254. See id. at 7-8.





treatment IND. 2 5 8 The treatment INDs provided significantly less
aid to terminally ill patients than had initially been anticipated,
with fewer than three being approved each year for any type of ill-
ness.259
Because of the failure of the treatment IND program to provide
the necessary aid to terminally ill patients, the FDA created an in-
dividual IND program in 1997.260 Individual INDs allowed a drug
sponsor or a patient's physician to apply for access to a new drug
for an individual patient who failed to gain access to the clinical
trials.261 The FDA approves individual INDs only if the application
includes sufficient information to show that no other treatment op-
tions exist, the drug is sufficiently safe and effective, and giving ac-
cess to the drug will not interfere with ongoing clinical trials or drug
marketing.262 Due to the time and effort required from physicians
in completing applications, the individual INDs have failed in
providing much greater access for terminally ill patients.263 The
advocates for expanded access may successfully lobby the FDA to
change its rules and allow the access sought by the Right to Try
laws, as that strategy has achieved expanded access in a limited
manner in the past.
D. Right to Try Laws as a Political Solution
Despite the failure of direct appeals to the FDA and Right to Try
laws to bring a significant improvement in expanded access, the
Right to Try laws may provide a political solution by instigating the
FDA to alter its rules. With many states enacting Right to Try laws
and pressure growing from advocates of expanded access, the FDA
attempted to simplify and expand the EAPs in order to give better
access to terminally ill patients and weaken the opposition against
its rules.2 6 4 While the requirements for gaining access through an
EAP remain similar to its initial requirements, the primary
258. See id.




263. See id. at 10.
264. See Alexander Gaffney, From 100 Hours to 1: FDA Dramatically Simplifies its Com-
passionate Use Process, REGULATORY AFFAIRS PROF'LS SOC'Y (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.
raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2015/02/04/21243/From- 100-Hours-to- 1-FDA-
Dramatically-Simplifies-its-Compassionate-Use-Process/. See also Investigational New
Drug Application, 21 C.F.R. § 312.310 (2015).
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changes since 1997 have consisted of simplification of the applica-
tion and the creation of two new EAP processes.265
Released on February 4, 2015, the new application provides a
much shorter and more streamlined version of the old EAP, while
also requiring less complex information that a physician could more
easily provide.266 In limited circumstances, patients' physicians
may even apply online or by telephone.267 The two new EAPs con-
sist of a single patient emergency program and an intermediate size
program.268 The intermediate size program presents an option sim-
ilar to the treatment IND, but for smaller patient groups.2 6 9 The
single patient emergency program allows an individual patient to
apply for access, similar to the individual IND, but does so with
faster access due to an emergency that limits the time that patient
has to obtain access.270 While these changes have made it much
easier for terminally ill patients to access experimental drugs, the
access is severely limited compared to that sought by Right to Try
laws and their advocates.
By creating the new EAPs, the FDA granted greater access to
drugs for terminally ill patients, attempting to relieve the pressure
placed on the FDA by the Right to Try laws.2 7 1 For the desires of
Right to Try advocates to be satisfied, the FDA must undertake sig-
nificant further change. The EAPs provide no access to new drugs
that have passed phase one, with access only allowed during or af-
ter phase three testing or, under seriously limited circumstances,
after phase two. 2 7 2 Further, the FDA still maintains full power to
deny any EAP application at its discretion.273
Ultimately, because the FDA's EAPs only aid patients after a te-
dious application process and allow access merely to drugs that are
nearly approved already, the EAPs provide little help to patients,
particularly compared to the potential access that would exist un-
der the Right to Try laws. The EAPs fail to provide the fuller access
to terminally ill patients that Right to Try laws seek. These pa-
tients may need a new drug currently in earlier phases of testing,
265. See Gaffney, supra note 264.
266. Id.
267. Id. The physician may file an EAP application by phone or online when the drug is
required for an emergency situation, which means that the patient needs the drug before the
required written application can be filed. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.310(d).




272. See Corieri, supra note 88, at 8.




which would have several years still before its approval. If Right to
Try laws continue to grow in popularity among the states, or even
in Congress, then they may pressure the FDA into loosening its
rules with respect to investigational new drug access for terminally
ill patients. By this process, the Right to Try laws may ultimately
provide a political solution to the issue of investigational new drug
access for terminally ill patients.
VII. CONCLUSION
While the FDA's rules regulating investigational new drugs may
provide protection for many patients against unsafe or ineffective
drugs, the rules also prevent many terminally ill patients from ob-
taining their last potentially life-saving treatment option. The FDA
clinical testing rules result in inefficient delays in the approval of
new drugs, as well as restrict access for patients who have no other
treatment options. Advocate groups challenged the FDA rules by
bringing a federal lawsuit against the FDA, arguing that the FDA
approval process infringed terminally ill patients' rights to privacy,
autonomy, and life. This attempt failed, however, as the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument hat access to investi-
gational new drugs constituted a fundamental right, and finding
the FDA rules did not infringe the patients' due process rights.2 74
Strong arguments support the belief that investigational new drug
access for terminally ill patients does, in fact, constitute a funda-
mental right, considering the circumstances of these patients who
have no other treatment options and will inevitably die without the
new drug, even if the probability of the new drug's success is low.
Since their federal lawsuit failed, advocates for expanded new
drug access for terminally ill patients have supported state Right to
Try laws as the most recent source for change in the law. 2 7 5 These
state laws provide no direct aid to patients, however, due to the su-
premacy of the federal law and regulations enacted by the FDA. An
advocate for expanded access could successfully use the state laws
to pressure the FDA into changing its regulations to expand access,
as has been done in the past by advocates for expanded access to
AIDS patients.
The state Right to Try laws have already succeeded in instigating
a simplification and expansion of access programs for terminally ill
274. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 695, 712 (D.C. Cir. 2007) [Abigail Alliance 11].
275. See, e.g., GOLDWATER INST., supra note 15. See also TENTH AMENDMENT CTR., supra
note 216 (displaying a map that shows each state's current position on the Right to Try laws
and providing information on each state's proposed or enacted Right to Try law).
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patients and may continue to push the FDA to expand access.
Therefore, the advocates for expanded access have gained limited
success with Right to Try laws and could reach further success as
the laws continue to gain political support, particularly under the
Trump presidency. The Right to Try laws may ultimately provide
a political solution to the issue of investigational new drug access
for terminally ill patients who have no other treatment options.
The state Right to Try laws may eventually bring about the long-
sought-after expanded access for terminally ill patients and will
surely aid in continuing the decades-long struggle of the Abigail Al-
liance and similar advocates for expanded access.

